


Altered Fingerprints: Detection and Localization



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October 25, 2018

Altered Fingerprints

Intentional destruction of friction ridge structures to obfuscate the true identity



Transplanted from Foot



Burnt with Acid



Fingerprint Alteration Cases

In 2009, a Chinese woman underwent a surgery to alter her fingerprints in order to deceive the immigrant fingerprint system in Japan



All foreigners are fingerprinted when they arrive in Japan. [1]



Some asylum seekers to EU, torch skin off their fingertips so they can not be identified by AFIS (EURODAC)

Eduardo Ravelo, part of FBI's top-10 most wanted list (2017), is believed to have had a plastic surgery and altered his fingerprints to evade authorities [2]



[1] <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8400222.stm>





[2] <https://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-10-most-wanted-criminals-list-2017-11>

Previous Approaches

Study	Method	Altered Fingerprint Dataset	Performance
Feng, Jain, and Ross, 2010	Orientation Field	1,976 simulated altered fingerprints	TDR = 92% @ FDR = 7%
Tiribuzi et al., 2012	Minutiae density maps, orientation entropies	1,000 genuine and synthetic altered fingerprints	Avg. Accuracy = 90.4%
Yoon et al. [2012, 2013]	Orientation field, minutiae distribution	4,433 operational altered fingerprints	TDR = 70.2% @ FDR = 2.1%
Ellingsgaard and Busch, [2014, 2017]	Orientation field, minutiae orientation	116 altered fingerprints	TDR = 92% @ FDR = 2.3%







Altered Fingerprint Dataset

- 4,815 operational altered fingerprints (635 tenprint cards of 270 subjects)
- # Tenprint cards/subject: 1 to 16 (multiple encounters)
- # Altered fingerprint instances/subject: 1 to 137
- 4,815 operational valid fingerprints
- 5-fold cross-validation employed
 - Training: 3,852 altered / 3,852 valid fingerprints
 - Testing : 963 altered / 963 valid fingerprints

	Valid	Altered
Train	 NFIQ2.0 = 64	 NFIQ2.0 = 7
Test	 NFIQ2.0 = 76	 NFIQ2.0 = 12


Altered Fingerprint Detection

- Fingerprint alteration classes based on alteration procedure:
 - Obliteration**: abrading, cutting, burning, etc.
 - Distortion**: surgical procedures to transplant skin causing unusual patterns
 - Imitation**: surgical procedures to transplant / remove skin while retaining fingerprint pattern
- Utilized single CNN model for all three alteration types due to:
 - Insufficient data for each alteration type,
 - Manual labeling is subjective; multiple alterations may exist in single fingerprint image.

Obliteration	Distortion	Imitation
 Scar	 Transplantation with Z-Cut	 Removal of portion of skin
 Mutilation	 Transplantation from other friction ridge, e.g. palm	 Transplantation to match ridge pattern

Altered Fingerprint Localization

- Manually marked ROI (i.e. areas of alterations) for randomly selected 1,182 altered fingerprints
- Patches (96 x 96) centered around minutiae are cropped; fingerprint alterations create spurious minutiae
- Local patches with $\geq 50\%$ overlap with the manually marked ROI labelled as *Altered*, remaining patches as *Valid*




ROI marked for altered regions in fingerprints

Proposed Approach

Altered Fingerprint Detection


Altered Fingerprint Localization



- Cascaded approach to detect and localize fingerprint alterations
- Employed CNN model to learn local “texture” around minutiae
- Robust to different fingerprint image sizes
- Large amount of training data to train deep CNNs

Experimental Results

- Achieved avg. **TDR = 99.24% @ FDR = 2%** across five folds (std. = 0.58%)
- Inception-v3 CNN model (99.24%) outperformed MobileNet-v1 model (92.40%); Computational requirement for Mobilenet-v1 model is almost 10 times lower compared to Inception-v3.
- Both models beat the previous state-of-the-art performance of TDR = 70.2% @ FDR = 2.1% for similar sized operational database
- Evaluation time/image = 50ms (Inception-v3), and 6ms (Mobilenet-v1) on NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU
- Performance on *altered fingerprint localization*:
 - 2-fold cross validation on manually labeled Altered/Valid patches (81,969 valid, and 89,979 altered); **EER = 8.5%**








ROC curves for altered fingerprint detection.

Experimental Results

Altered Fingerprint Detection

Altered Fingerprint Localization

		Output	
		Valid	Altered
Ground Truth	Valid	 <p>Alteration Score: 0.0</p>	 <p>Alteration Score: 0.78</p>
	Altered	 <p>Alteration Score: 0.31</p>	 <p>Alteration Score: 0.98</p>



Synthetic Altered Fingerprint Generation


- To remedy the lack of publicly available altered fingerprint datasets, we trained a Generative Adversarial Network to generate synthetic altered fingerprints.
- Utilized DC-GAN architecture with following parameters [1]; trained on all of the 4,815 operational altered fingerprints

Architecture	DC-GAN
Input Size	512 x 512
Batch Size	64
Optimizer	Adam
Learning Rate	0.0002
Momentum	0.5
Iterations	1,350
Output Size	256 x 256


- Generated a total of 4,060 synthetic altered fingerprints

Synthetic Altered Fingerprint Generation

Synthetic Altered Fingerprints



Operational Altered Fingerprints



Summary

- Proposed a robust and accurate method of altered fingerprint detection and localization,
- Achieved a TDR = 99.24% @ FDR = 2% on an operational dataset of 4,815 altered, and 4,815 valid fingerprint images,
- Trained a GAN model to alleviate the lack of publicly available altered fingerprint datasets by generating synthetic altered fingerprints.

Future Work

- Refining the GAN network to improve the characteristics of synthetic altered fingerprints, control the type of alterations, and use fingerprint match scores to evaluate GAN model,
- Pre- and post-analysis of altered fingerprint images to benchmark the effect of alteration on recognition accuracy.